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Tort Law. Beattie v. Fleet National Bank, 746 A.2d 717 (R.I.
2000). In a suit for libel, a statement of opinion can only be defam-
atory if "it implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as
the basis for the opinion."1 Here, the alleged defamatory state-
ment was based on disclosed, non-defamatory facts. Thus, the
statement was non-defamatory.
In Beattie v. Fleet National Bank, the alleged defamatory
statement was an opinion based on disclosed, non-defamatory facts
(including a seven-page memorandum setting out in detail the ba-
sis for the opinion).2 The Rhode Island Supreme Court has held
that one's constitutional liberty includes publishing opinionative
statements based on disclosed, non-defamatory facts, regardless of
whether or not the statement is justifiable.3 Thus, the opiniona-
tive statement in the present case was non-defamatory and conse-
quently not actionable.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Fleet Mortgage (Fleet), the defendant, hired Beattie, the plain-
tiff, to appraise a particular piece of residential real estate.4 Beat-
tie appraised the property and sent a report to Fleet.5 A Fleet in-
house staff appraiser examined Beattie's report and found several
deficiencies, including Beattie's appraisal valuation and methodol-
ogy.6 Specifically, Beattie relied on the recent sales prices of colo-
nial-style houses in the area, whereas the property to be appraised
was of the raised-ranch style; some of the houses Beattie used as
comparables contained much larger square footage than the prop-
erty in question; some of the homes Beattie relied upon were in
different neighborhoods and up to a mile away; and two of the com-
parable properties Beattie used included water views. 7
Fleet's in-house staff appraiser then prepared a seven-page
memorandum detailing Beattie's report's deficiencies and gave it
to Fleet's chief appraiser, Cornwell.8 Cornwell wrote a letter to
1. Beattie v. Fleet Nat'l Bank, 746 A.2d 717,722 (R.I. 2000) (quoting Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 566 (1976)).
2. See Beattie, 746 A.2d at 728.
3. See id. at 721.
4. See id. at 719.
5. See id.
6. See id. at 720.
7. See id.
8. See id.
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Beattie dated February 14, 1996, that reiterated the deficiencies
outlined in the memorandum, which was sent to Beattie with the
letter, and also included four bullet-point statements summarizing
Fleet's criticisms of Beattie's report.9 In the letter, Cornwell asked
Beattie to submit information that would vindicate Beattie's ap-
praisal in regard to Fleet's outlined concerns.' 0 The last para-
graph of the letter that Cornwell wrote included the following
statement: "In the aggregate, the data in this report combines to
present such a misleading indication of the value of this property
as to be considered fraudulent.""
Beattie replied to the letter from Fleet on February 24, 1996;
however, Fleet decided that the letter failed to justify Beattie's
findings. 12 Fleet replied to Beattie's letter of February 24, 1996,
with a letter dated March 20, 1996, informing Beattie that Fleet
did not agree with Beattie's appraisal or his methodology and that
Fleet had removed Beattie from their list of approved real estate
appraisers.' 3
Beattie sued Fleet National Bank, Fleet Mortgage and
Cornwell for the alleged defamatory statement in the letter dated
February 14, 1996.14 The defendants filed a motion for summary
judgment on the grounds that the statement was not defamatory,
but rather a derogatory opinion based on disclosed, non-defama-
tory facts. 15 The Superior Court granted the defendants' motion
based on the Rhode Island Supreme Court holding that an opinion
based on disclosed non-defamatory facts is not actionable. 16
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The court stated that Beattie had the burden to show that de-
fendants communicated a "false and defamatory" statement about
him, and that the question of whether a statement is defamatory is
a matter of law. 17 After reviewing prior case law, the court stated
that an opinionative statement is only defamatory if it is based on
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. Id.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id. at 720-21.
17. Id. at 721.
2001] 789
790 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:593
undisclosed defamatory facts.' 8 Also in Belliveau,19 the court en-
dorsed section 556 of the Restatement of Torts, which states, "[a]
defamatory communication may consist of a statement in the form
of an opinion, but a statement of this nature is actionable only if it
implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis
for the opinion."20
In the present case, the court found that the statement made
by Cornwell in the letter dated February 14, 1996, was based on
facts that were fully disclosed and explained to Beattie in the letter
and in the seven-page memorandum. 21 The supreme court cited
Partington v. Bugliosi,22 where the Ninth Circuit stated, "when an
author outlines the facts available to him, thus making it clear
that the challenged statements represent his own interpretation of
those facts and leaving the reader free to draw his own conclu-
sions, those statements are generally protected by the First
Amendment." 23 Also, the court noted that Cornwell's opinion did
not imply that he knew other facts that were defamatory or undis-
closed.24 Cornwell disclosed that the main reason for his opinion
rested on the other properties that Beattie selected as corn-
parables: Beattie used colonial homes instead of raised ranch
homes, the houses were located in different neighborhoods than
the property in question, and in some cases the houses used as
comparables were much larger and in others on the waterfront. 25
Also, Cornwell disagreed with Beattie's valuations of the dif-
ferences in those properties in comparison to the property in ques-
tion: for example, Beattie only added $10,000 to the price of a
$400,000 dollar property for its waterfront location.26 The memo-
randum accompanying the letter laid out the deficiencies in Beat-
18. See id. (citing Belliveau v. Rerick, 504 A.2d 1360 (R.I. 1986)). The court
stated that in Belliveau the alleged defamatory statement was not defamatory be-
cause it was based on a four-page summary of the plaintiffs activities, thus the
opinion was based on disclosed, non-defamatory facts. See Beattie, 746 A.2d at
721.
19. 504 A.2d 1360 (R.I. 1986).
20. Beattie, 746 A.2d at 722 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 566
(1976)).
21. See id. at 725.
22. 56 F.2d 1047 (9th Cir. 1995).
23. Beattie, 746, A.2d at 725 (quoting Partington, 56 F.2d at 1156-57).
24. See id.
25. See id. at 726.
26. See id.
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tie's appraisal, which the court stated "provided a largely factual,
non-defamatory basis for Cornwell's opining.., that the data used
in Beattie's report combined to present such a misleading indica-
tion... 'as to be considered fraudulent.'" 27
The court also stated that the term "fraudulent" that Cornwell
used in the letter could not be construed to assert that Beattie had
himself committed a fraudulent act, but rather the statement was
merely a non-actionable, rhetorical hyperbole. 28
The court rejected Beattie's argument that there remained an
issue of fact to be resolved in regard to whether Cornwell had
enough information to state that Beattie's appraisal could be con-
sidered fraudulent.29 The court stated that Beattie's argument
was simply not supported by the record.
CONCLUSION
In a suit for libel, a statement of opinion can only be defamatory if
"it implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the ba-
sis for the opinion."30 The court stated that the trial court justice
correctly held that Cornwell's opinionative statement was based on
disclosed, non-defamatory facts, and thus the statement was not
actionable.
Stan Pupecki
27. Id.
28. See id. at 727.
29. See id. at 728.
30. Beattie v. Fleet Nat'l Bank, 746 A.2d 717, 722 (R.I. 2000) (quoting Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 566 (1976)).
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Tort Law. Cain v. Johnson, 755 A.2d 156 (R.I. 2000). Decedent,
who fell from Cliff Walk while walking there after closing time,
was a trespasser despite defendants' failure to put decedent on no-
tice of closing time. Because decedent was a trespasser, no liability
existed since the defendants were not actually aware of his pres-
ence. Defendants had no duty to warn trespassers about the seri-
ously eroded condition existing on the grassy area next to Cliff
Walk because those conditions merely constituted a natural condi-
tion of land.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On August 6, 1991, at approximately 2:00 a.m., Michael Cain
and his friends walked along Cliff Walk in Newport (City).' Per
the City's ordinance, Cliff Walk closed at 9:00 p.m. except for the
purpose of fishing.2 The closing time, however, was not posted at
the Forty Steps entrance used by Michael and his companions. 3
When Michael reached the area of the Cliff Walk near Salve Re-
gina University, he stepped off the paved area and onto the grassy
area towards the edge of the cliff.4 This area had been apparently
well-trodden and was bounded by an eight-inch wall.5 Michael
stepped into a hole directly next to the wall.8 The hole, which had
been created by erosion, was masked by vegetation.7 The ground
gave way beneath Michael's feet." Michael fell to his death on the
rocks approximately fifty-three feet below.9
Plaintiffs William G. Cain and Mary H. Cain filed a wrongful
death action on Michael's behalf against the defendants City of
Newport, the State of Rhode Island and Salve Regina University,
alleging that Michael had fallen due to the defendants' failure to
properly inspect, maintain and repair the Cliff Walk.10 Much evi-
dence was presented indicating that the defendants had long been
aware of the eroded conditions and the consequent hazards ex-
1. See Cain v. Johnson, 755 A.2d 156, 158 (R.I. 2000).
2. See id. at 159.
3. See id. at 170.
4. See id. at 158.
5. See id. at 162-63.
6. See id. at 163.
7. See id. at 167.
8. See id. at 158.
9. See id. at 163.
10. See id. at 158.
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isting at Cliff Walk. 1 The defendants moved for summary judg-
ment, arguing that because the Cliff Walk had been closed at the
time of the accident, Michael had been a trespasser and defendants
had only owed him the duty to refrain from willful and wanton con-
duct after actually discovering him.12 Summary judgment was
granted. 13 The motion justice reconsidered the ruling, but allowed
it to stand.14 Plaintiffs then appealed the grant of summary
judgment.15
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal, a majority of the Cain court agreed with the motion
judge's ruling that Michael had been a trespasser and therefore
the defendants were only obligated to avoid inflicting wanton and
willful injury after actually discovering him on the premises.' 6
The plaintiffs argued that Michael should not have been consid-
ered a trespasser because he had never received sufficient notice
that he was a trespasser.' 7 In support of their argument, plaintiffs
pointed to the fact that the City of Newport had never sought to
enforce the ordinance closing the park at 9:00 p.m.'8 Furthermore,
the plaintiffs argued, while the Cliff Walk hours were only posted
at the beginning and end of the Cliff Walk, there are numerous
entrance points along the approximately 18,000 foot Cliff Walk
where no hours are posted, including the Forty Steps entrance
taken by Michael. 19
The court rejected this line of reasoning, noting its prior hold-
ing in Bennett v. Napolitano.20 In that case, plaintiff, who had
been injured in Roger Williams Park, had argued that he should
not have been considered a trespasser because the park rangers
and city police had never attempted to enforce the city closing ordi-
nances during the ten years that the plaintiff had used the park
11. See id. at 166-68.
12. See id. at 158.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id. at 159.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. 746 A.2d 138 (R.I. 2000).
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after hours.21 The court disagreed, noting that the rangers and
police had had no authority to waive the closing ordinance or give
implied consent to use the park after hours.22 Similarly, the court
reasoned that Michael's knowledge or notice of the closing ordi-
nance was irrelevant to the question of whether or not he was a
trespasser. 23 Therefore, because Michael was on the path at 2:00
a.m., he was properly considered a trespasser as a matter of law. 24
The plaintiffs also attempted to persuade the court to adopt
the level of care owed to trespassers as enunciated in the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts section 334 (1965), which imposed liability
on landowners for failing to use reasonable care for a trespasser's
safety. When that landowner knows, or ought to know, that a par-
ticular portion of his or her land is constantly being intruded upon
by trespassers. 25 Under that test, Michael would have been owed
the duty of reasonable care because there was substantial evidence
that the City of Newport knew of after-hours use of the Cliff
Walk,26 and therefore should have anticipated his presence.27
The Cain majority, however, rejected this invitation to change
the duty of care owed to trespassers on land.28 The court observed
that in the 1975 case of Mariorenzi v. Joseph DiPonte, Inc.,29 it had
attempted to eliminate the different levels of care owed to tres-
passers, licensees and invitees in favor of a single standard.30
However, a mere nineteen years later, the court had restored the
distinction between invitees and trespassers, and had since held
fast to the position that no duty was owed to a trespasser until he
or she was actually discovered in a position of peril.31 Because
21. See id. at 141.
22. See id. at 142.
23. See Cain, 755 A.2d at 160.
24. See id.
25. See id. at 160 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 334 (1965)).
26. See id. at 171-72.
27. See id. at 160.
28. See id. at 160-61.
29. 333 A.2d 127 (1975).
30. See Cain, 755 A.2d at 161 (citing Mariorenzi, 333 A.2d at 131 n.2).
31. See id. at 160 (citing Tantimoncio v. Allendale Mut. Ins., 637 A.2d 1056,
1061 (R.I. 1994)); Wolf v. Natl R.R. Passenger Corp., 697 A.2d 1082, 1086 (R.I.
1997); Zoubra v. New York, New Haven and Hartford R.R. Co., 150 A.2d 643, 644-
45 (R.I. 1959)).
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Michael had never been discovered, then, the court reasoned that
no duty of care had been owed him.32
The plaintiffs also attempted to argue that the land where
Michael fell had been maintained in an artificial condition, and
therefore the defendants were liable regardless of Michael's tres-
passer status.33 The Restatement (Second) of Torts section 337 im-
poses liability on landowners who maintain an artificial condition
involving a risk of death or serious bodily harm, where the land-
owner: 1) fails to exercise reasonable care in warning trespassers;
2) knows or has reason to know of the trespasser's presence in dan-
gerous proximity to the condition; and 3) has reason to believe that
the trespasser will not discover it or realize the risk.34 Although
the precise area from which Michael fell had been an unpaved
area, the plaintiffs argued, the paved nature of Cliff Walk itself
created an artificial condition of land.35 The court, however, held
that the elements of this test for liability were not met here. First,
the court held that exact area from where Michael had fallen, the
unpaved area, was a natural rather than artificial condition.36
Even if the paved Cliff Walk created an artificial condition of the
land, the risks inherent on a cliff, particularly in the dark, are suf-
ficiently obvious that a trespasser will realize the risk.37
The court also considered the argument that City's liability
had been limited under Rhode Island General Laws sections 32-6-3
and 32-6-5. Section 32-6-3 limits the liability of landowners who
invite or permit their property to be used for recreational pur-
poses. 38 Section 32-6-5 provides that there is no limit upon the lia-
bility of a landowner who willfully or maliciously fails to guard or
warn against a dangerous condition after discovering a user's
peril.39 The defendant had argued that these limitations on liabil-
ity applied to the state and municipalities at the time of the acci-
dent.40 The plaintiffs and state argued that these statutes had
32. See Cain, 755 A.2d at 162.
33. See id.
34. See id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 337)(1986)).
35. See id.
36. See id. at 163.
37. See id.
38. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 32-6-3 (1956) (1994 Reenactment).
39. See id. § 32-6-5 (1956) (1994 Reenactment).
40. See Cain, 755 A.2d at 164.
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only applied to private landowners. 41 The court did not decide this
since the statutes were inapplicable to this case in any event. 42
Under the statute, there was no duty to a trespasser until discov-
ered in a position of peril. Therefore, since Michael had not been
discovered, there had been no duty.43
The Concurrence
Associate Justice Flanders wrote a concurring opinion, in
which he was joined in part by Justice Goldberg." Flanders
agreed that Michael's subjective ignorance that the Cliff Walk was
closed did not convert Michael's status to that of an invitee or to a
licensee owed a higher duty of care.45 Flanders, however, pointed
out that under Restatement (Second) of Torts (1986) section 335, a
landowner is liable for bodily harm to trespassers caused by an ar-
tificial condition on the land if that artificial condition is one which
the landowner 1) created or maintained; 2) knows it is likely to
cause the trespassers death or serious bodily harm; 3) has reason
to believe that trespassers will not discover it; and 4) has failed to
use reasonable care in warning the trespasser.46 Under the Com-
ment to section 335, this rule appears to apply to natural condi-
tions of the land.47 Following this test, Flanders concluded the
defendants' mere knowledge of the dangers of the Cliff Walk gener-
ally would not have been sufficient to defeat summary judgment.48
However, if there was any evidence that the defendants had known
that trespassers continually intruded on the particular place
where Michael fell, and had known about the particular hole in the
ground and the hidden danger that it represented, summary judg-
ment should not have been granted.49
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id. at 164.
45. See id. at 165.
46. See id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 335 (1986)).
47. See id. at 166 n.2 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 335 cmt. b
(1986)).
48. See id.
49. See id.
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The Dissent
Associate Justice Goldberg wrote a ringing dissent.50
Goldberg asserted that Michael was not a trespasser.5 1 Goldberg
noted that the City of Newport and the State had historically
treated and developed the area as a public easement.52 The City of
Newport had long expressed its intent not to enforce the closing
ordinance and had failed to post the closing hours in a manner
which would be apparent to anybody entering.53 Therefore,
Goldberg concluded that the license to use the Cliff Walk had not
been revoked. 54 In any event, the City ordinance itself made an
exception for fishing.5 5 Under the Restatement view, Goldberg
noted, where a landowner opens his land to a particular class of
persons, it is irrelevant that a particular person does not know of
the precise use for which the land is opened; that person remains a
licensee. 56 Because Michael was not a trespasser, then, he had
been owed the same duty of reasonable care that is owed to a licen-
see or invitee.57
Even if Michael had not been a trespasser, Justice Goldberg
felt that the duty of care owed Michael had still been violated. She
also argued that the area where Michael had fallen had long been
used as a sort of man-made lookout over the water and thus in-
creased the likelihood that a stroller would encounter the hole.58
Since an eight-inch wall in fact defined that area, Goldberg con-
cluded that Michael had not fallen due to a natural condition of the
land.59 Finally, Goldberg cited the fact that the City and State had
been repeatedly placed on notice of the danger of collapse, particu-
larly in the very area from which Michael fell, yet chose to do noth-
ing.60 Therefore, Goldberg opined that the City and State had had
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 170-71.
53. See id. at 171-72.
54. See id.
55. See id. at 171.
56. See id. at 172 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 330 (1965)).
57. See id. at 172.
58. See id. at 168.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 166-68.
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actual notice of the hazards and had been recklessly indifferent to-
wards Michael's safety.6 '
Accordingly, Justice Goldberg concluded, summary judgment
should not have been granted to the City. Furthermore, Justice
Goldberg noted, because the City could not defend based upon
Michael's status as a trespasser, the State could not rely upon that
defense either.62 Because there was evidence that the State had
long joined with the City in improving Cliff Walk, there should be a
trial to determine whether or not the State, too, was an owner. 63
Salve Regina, however, was a mere abutter who had no liability.64
CONCLUSION
The Cain majority continued the Rhode Island Supreme
Court's earlier line of cases holding that a person using a public
park after closing time is a trespasser despite the fact that the pub-
lic body responsible for its operation fails to make the public aware
of the closing time. Additionally, the Cain majority rejected an-
other invitation to eliminate the difference in the duty of care owed
to invitees, and the duty of care owed to trespassers. Under the
standard owed to trespassers, the defendants had no liability un-
less they were actually aware of the decedent's presence; mere
awareness of the after-hours use of the park was not sufficient. Fi-
nally, although the paved area of Cliff Walk itself constituted an
unnatural condition of land, the duty to warn trespassers of any
dangerous and hidden conditions ended when trespassing decedent
stepped from that paved area of Cliff Walk. Once the trespassing
decedent stepped on the grass near the paved area of Cliff Walk, he
was on a natural condition of the land, and the defendants owed
him no duty to warn of the seriously eroded condition of that land.
Vicki J. Bejma
61. See id.
62. See id. at 172.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 173.
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Tort Law. Kiley v. Patterson, 763 A.2d 583 (R.I. 2000). A partici-
pant in a coed softball game does not assume the risk of injury
inflicted by the reckless or intentional misconduct of other
participants.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
While playing second base in a recreational, coed softball
game, Lori Kiley (Kiley) suffered injuries to her knee when a male
base runner, Steven Patterson (Patterson), slid into her.' Patter-
son was attempting to reach second base on a ball hit on the
ground to third base.2 In an attempt to break up the potential
double play, Patterson aggressively slid into second base with his
arms in the air and with one of his feet high enough in the air to
strike Kiley's knee.3 Kiley sued Patterson for her injuries and Pat-
terson moved for summary judgment.4 Summary judgment was
granted to Patterson on the grounds that Kiley had voluntarily as-
sumed the risk of incurring this type of physical contact injury by
playing the game of softball.5 Kiley appealed to the Rhode Island
Supreme Court. 6
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal, Kiley argued that the motion justice erred in grant-
ing summary judgment for three reasons.7 First, Kiley argued
that the justice improperly applied a deliberate misconduct or
recklessness standard instead of an ordinary negligence standard.8
Second, Kiley argued that even assuming that a recklessness stan-
dard applied, there were questions of fact concerning Patterson's
slide, and therefore summary judgment should not have been
granted.9 Third, Kiley argued that there was no evidence to justify
the trial justice's conclusion that she had assumed the risk of her
injury. 10
1. See Kiley v. Patterson, 763 A.2d 583, 584 (R.I. 2000).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id. at 585.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
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The Rhode Island Supreme Court has never considered what
standard of care should be applied when determining liability in
cases involving co-participants in an athletic event.11 Therefore,
the supreme court had to determine whether to institute a "height-
ened recklessness or deliberate misconduct standard or one of ordi-
nary negligence." 12 In making its decision, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court adopted the rule and policies set forth by the New
Jersey Supreme Court in Crawn v. Campo.i3 In Crawn, the New
Jersey Supreme Court held that "the duty of care applicable to par-
ticipants in informal recreational sports is to avoid the infliction of
injury caused by reckless or intentional conduct." 14 The New
Jersey Supreme Court justified the imposition of the recklessness
standard to promote vigorous participation in athletic events and
to avoid a flood of litigation. i
The Rhode Island Supreme Court soundly adopted the holding
in Crawn, adopting the "heightened recklessness-or-intentional-
misconduct standard" which effectively "rule[s] out the possibility
of any recovery based upon mere negligence." 16 The supreme court
found that the trial justice erred in granting summary judgment
because material issues of fact existed as to whether Patterson was
"merely negligent or whether he acted deliberately or in reckless
disregard of injuring Kiley when he slid into her knee... with his
foot raised high .. . .17
In reviewing the evidence presented to the trial justice, the su-
preme court found that Kiley had offered evidence to support her
claim that Patterson had slid into her knee with his foot held high
and in a reckless manner.' 8 Kiley also introduced testimony from
the softball league's commissioner, John Leistritz, who testified
that the league had a specific rule prohibiting the kind of take-out
slide performed by Patterson.19 Therefore, the supreme court
found that a reasonable jury could have concluded that Patterson's
11. See id.
12. Id.
13. See id. at 586 (citing Crawn v. Campo, 643 A.2d 600, 601, 603-04 (N.J.
1994)).
14. Id. (quoting Crawn, 643 A.2d at 604).
15. See id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 587.
18. See id. at 586.
19. See id.
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actions were not only against the league's rules, but perhaps too
aggressive and rambunctious for such a recreational coed softball
game.20 The supreme court also found that it could not be con-
cluded as a matter of law that Kiley assumed the risk of her inju-
ries as a result of the "deliberate or reckless misconduct on the
part of opposing players acting in violation of league rules."21
CONCLUSION
In Kiley v. Patterson, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
adopted a heightened recklessness or intentional misconduct stan-
dard of care for participants engaging in recreational athletic
events.
Heather M. Spellman
20. See id.
21. Id. at 587.
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Tort Law. Sindelar v. Leguia, 750 A.2d 967 (R.I. 2000). Rhode
Island's Wrongful Death Act (Act) clearly and unambiguously de-
scribes those entitled to recover under the Act. If a decedent dies
with no spouse or children, any amount recovered under the Act
will be distributed to the next of kin as if the decedent died intes-
tate, without any inquiry into the nature or quality of the heir's
relationship with the decedent. There is no statutory nor public
policy mandated "absentee parent" exception to the distribution
scheme.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Virginia L. Sindelar (Sindelar), and Luis G. Leguia (Leguia)
were divorced in 1982.1 They had two children together.2 Leguia
paid child support until the children reached the age of majority,
provided health insurance for the children, and contributed to
their college educations.3 Sindelar alleges that other than these
contributions, Leguia had no relationship with the children other
than visitation rights. 4
The eldest son, Gregor, was killed in an automobile accident
on November 30, 1996, in Rhode Island, at the age of twenty-nine.5
Gregor was unmarried at the time of his death, had no children
and did not leave a will. 6
Sindelar settled wrongful death claims for Gregor's estate ap-
proximating $116,000. 7 Sindelar filed a motion in November 1997
in the probate court attempting to prevent Leguia from receiving
part of the wrongful death settlement proceeds." Sindelar argued
that Leguia was barred from recovery under Rhode Island's
Wrongful Death Act because of Leguia's lack of contact with Gre-
gor.9 The probate court motion was denied. 10 Sindelar appealed to
the Superior Court, where Leguia moved for summary judgment."
1. See Sindelar v. Leguia, 750 A.2d 967, 968 (R.I. 2000).
2. See id. at 969.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
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The hearing judge granted summary judgment, finding that
Leguia was entitled to his share of the settlement without inquiry
into the nature of his relationship with his son under the plain lan-
guage of the Act. 12 Sindelar appealed to the supreme court.13
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court employed a de novo stan-
dard in analyzing the facts of this case and examined the facts in
the light most favorable to Sindelar in determining whether or not
summary judgment should be granted in favor of Leguia. 14 Sinde-
lar made two arguments to the court. 15
Summary Judgment Motion
Sindelar first argued that the hearing judge erred in granting
summary judgment as there was no discovery and no supporting
affidavits filed by Leguia. 16 She asserted that the motion was pro-
cedurally defective. 17 The court found Sindelar's argument that
the summary judgment motion was procedurally defective without
merit.' 8 Rule 56(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure
allows for a motion for summary judgment "with or without sup-
porting affidavits."' 9 Thus, the court reasoned that having no sup-
porting affidavits "simply cannot be error."20 For summary
judgment to be granted, there only need be "no genuine issues of
material fact and that judgment for the moving party be appropri-
ate as a matter of law."2 1 The court found that there were no genu-
ine issues of material fact in this case.22 It also found that the
record reflected that the trial justice properly disposed of the case
as matter of law.2 3 The court, therefore, rejected Sindelar's first
argument.2 4
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id. at 970.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. Id. (quoting R.I. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 56(b)).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id.
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Interpretation of the Wrongful Death Act
Sindelar also argued that the hearing justice incorrectly inter-
preted the Act.25 Advocating an "absentee parent" exception to re-
covery under the Act, she asserted that the General Assembly
intended to provide compensation only to a "decedent's heirs at law
who possessed a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit from
the ongoing life of the decedent."26 Sindelar alleged that since
Leguia had no contact with Gregor and had no reasonable expecta-
tion of pecuniary benefit from his son, Leguia should not be able to
recover under the Act.27
The court rejected Sindelar's argument that the hearing jus-
tice incorrectly interpreted and applied the Wrongful Death Act.28
Her argument that the Legislature intended that only those with a
reasonable expectation of pecuniary gain from the continued life of
the decedent would recover under the Act is based on the Legisla-
ture's use of the term "pecuniary damages" in section 10-7-1.1 of
the Act. 29
The court found that the language of section 10-7-2 of the Act
was clear and unambiguous. 30 It provides that if a person dies
without a spouse or children, the amount recovered in a wrongful
death action be distributed equally to those who would take under
Rhode Island intestacy law.31 Here, the next of kin would be Gre-
gor's parents.32
The Act recognizes two exceptions to the recovery provision.33
The first applies to parents who have failed to pay child support
and the second applies when one of the parents is the cause of
25. See id. at 969.
26. Id. at 970.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id. Section 10-7-2 provides in pertinent part that "if there are no chil-
dren, the whole shall go to the husband or widow, and, if there is no husband or
widow, to the next of kin, in the proportion provided by law in relation to the distri-
bution of personal property left by persons dying intestate .... ." R.I. Gen. Laws
§ 10-7-2 (1956) (1997 Reenactment).
32. See Sindelar, 750 A.2d at 971.
33. See id.
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death.34 Neither of the exceptions applied to this case and the
court refused to carve out a new exception. 35
The court first found that the plain language of the statute
was controlling and that nothing in the pecuniary damages section
10-7-1.1 is incompatible with the plain language of section 10-7-
2.36 The court then distinguished the proposed "absentee parent"
exception from the "cause of death" exception. 37 In creating the
"cause of death" exception, the court "applied this jurisdiction's
well settled public policy"38 in order to conclude "that a tortfeasor
should not benefit from his or her own wrongdoing."39 The court
thus determined that the tortfeasor should be "precluded from re-
covery under the Act, where that tortfeasor's negligence was ad-
judged the proximate cause of the decedent's death."40 Unlike the
"cause of death" exception, there is here no legislative intent or
stated public policy that would require the court to carve out a new
exception to the Act.41 The court concluded that an "absentee par-
ent" exception would have to originate in the Legislature. 42 There-
fore, the court rejected Sindelar's second argument, Sindelar's
appeal was denied and the summary judgment for Leguia
affirmed.43
CONCLUSION
Rhode Island's Wrongful Death Act clearly and unambigu-
ously describes those entitled to recover under the Act. There is no
statutory nor public policy mandated "absentee parent" exception
to the distribution scheme. If a decedent dies with no spouse or
children, any amount recovered under the Act will be distributed
to the next of kin as if the decedent died intestate, without any
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id. at 971-72.
37. See id. at 972.
38. Id. at 972.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id. at 973.
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inquiry into the nature or quality of the heir's relationship with the
decedent.
Tanya J. Zorabedian
